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The Domestic Legal Status of the GATT:
The Need for Clarificatioir
L Introduction
The growing economic interdependence of the nations of the world needs
no comment. Armed conflict and social unrest m the Middle East affect
farmers m Iowa and France and motor vehicle workers in Michigan and
Germany Interest-rate decisions taken in Washington have a profound
influence on the external debt of many developing countries, which in
turn affects their ability to purchase goods made in industrial countries
and to provide their citizenry with economic advancement. Environ-
mental problems have obvious cross-border effects. More and more
frequently, government leaders find their freedom of action circum-
scribed because of the impact of external economic factors on their
national economies.'
For more than forty-five years, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)2 has been the preeminent instrument governng international
trade relations.3 The drafters intended for the GATT to promote the
expansion of trade, as well as international cooperation and mterdepen-
dence.4 Current international economic and trade conditions suggest that
* The author gratefully acknowledges the insights of Professor Frederic L. Kirgis,
Jr. in preparation of this Note.
1. JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 1-2 (1990).
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
3. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 27 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON,
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; John H. Jackson, he General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv 249, 250 (1967) [hereinafter Jackson,
GAT in U.S. Law].
4. See GATT, supra note 2, pmbl. (discussing goals and aspirations of GATT); Kuo-
Lee Li, The Law of GAYT. Study and Research, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 357, 357 (1984)
(stating that GATT is most significant achievement in development and liberalization of
international trade since World War I; see also JACKSON, supra note 1, 9-10 (discussing
origins of GATT). According to Professor Jackson, a desire for lower tariffs and the
recognition that protectionist economic policies were in part responsible for the disasters
leading to World War II led the United States and its allies to establish post-war economic
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the GATT has succeeded in carrying out this design and that it will
continue to be the preeminent instrument governing international trade for
years to come.5
The GATT plays an important role in the trade policy of the United
States.6 Although Congress has not expressly approved the GATT,
Congress recognizes the GATT as the primary instrument of United States
trade policy 7 Moreover, all three branches of the federal government
recognize the binding effect of the GATT 8 An opinion by a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mississippi Poultry
Ass'n v Madigan,9 however, raises questions about the force of the GATT
as a binding international obligation of the United States. In Mississippi
Poultry, nonprofit trade associations consisting of domestic poultry
producers and processors (Associations) challenged a regulation that the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Food Safety and Inspection Services
(Agency) promulgated pursuant to section 466(d) of the Poultry Products
Inspection Act (PPIA).10 Section 466(d) provides that all imported poultry
institutions. 1d.
5. See supra note 1 and'accompanying text (discussing economic interdependence
among nations). The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations cemented the GATT's position as the primary instrument of international trade.
See Peter Behr, U.S., Europe Reach Trade Agreement; Global Tariffs to Fall; Last Issue
Sidestepped, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1993, at Al (noting that after seven years of talks,
stage is set for "historic accord" that will bring almost all forms of international commerce
under GATT).
6. See Thomas L. Friedman, The World Trade Agreement: The View in Washington;
Clinton and Some in Congress See Less Trouble This Time, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at
D8 (noting President Clinton's enthusiasm for new GATT agreement). President Clinton
asserted that the new GATT agreement will increase American exports and "cement[ ] our
position of leadership in the new global economy " Id.
7 Jackson, GATT in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 265-69. The President has the
power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
The President controls the negotiation process, and if two-thirds of the Senate approve the
treaty, the President can ratify the treaty See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 130 (1972) (discussing operation of treaty power).
The GATT has never been formally submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.
Jackson, GATT in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 253, 265. Thus, the GATT operates as an
executive agreement rather than a treaty obligation. Id. at 253-54; see also infra note 75
and accompanying text (noting that GATT operates as congressional-executive agreement).
8. Jackson, GAYT in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 260.
9. 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993).
10. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1360-61 (5th Cir.)
(concluding that regulation promulgated by Secretary of Agriculture and Food Safety and
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products shall be subject to "the same" inspection standards as those applied
in the United States and shall be processed under "the same" conditions as
similar products produced m the United States.1" The Agency's implement-
ing regulation required foreign inspection systems to maintain a poultry
inspection program that was "at least equal" to that applied in the United
States. 2 The Associations argued that the Agency's regulation violated the
plain language of section 466(d) and, therefore, was arbitrary and
capricious. 3 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi agreed and granted the Associations' motion for summary
judgment.1
4
The court of appeals, in affirming the district court's judgment, held
that Congress clearly expressed an intent in both section 466(d) and a
subsequent declaration inserted into the Food, Agriculture, Conservation,
and Trade Act of 1990 (1990 Act),' 5 that "the same as" language in section
466(d) means "identical. "16 In reaching this conclusion, the court dismissed
the Agency's argument that the court should reject the interpretation
Inspection Services (Agency) was not consistent with congressional intent), amended, 9 F.3d
1113 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
I1. 21 U.S.C. § 466(d) (1988).
12. Missssippt Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1361. More than three-fourths of the comments
the Agency received during the notice and comment period opposed the "at least equal"
regulation. Id.
13. Id. at 1362.
14. Id.
15. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624,
104 Stat. 3359 (1990). Section 2507 of this Act provides:
(3) [O]n October 30, 1989, the Secretary of Agriculture, through the [FSIS],
promulgated a regulation implementing the 1985 amendment
providing that a foreign inspection system seeking certification for export of
poultry to the United States merely impose requirements at least equal to those
applicable in the United States.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of the Congress that-
(1) the regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, through the
[FSIS], with respect to poultry products offered for importation into the
United States does not reflect the intention of the Congress; and
(2) to urge the Secretary, through the [FSIS], to repeal the October 30,
1989, regulation and promulgate a new regulation reflecting the intention of
the Congress.
Id.
16. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (5th Cir.),
amended, 9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
483
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equating "same as" with "identical" because this interpretation violated
GATT obligations.17
The panel opimon in Mississippi Poultry suggests that the GATT is
more susceptible than other international obligations to the whims of
Congress. 8 Congress has the authority to enact legislation that abrogates
or violates an existing international treaty or agreement.' 9 Absent a clear
expression of congressional intent to abrogate or violate an existing
international agreement or treaty, however, courts generally will construe
domestic legislation consistently with prior international obligations.' In
Mississippi Poultry, the court suggested that this rule of construction does
not apply when Congress enacts a statute that potentially conflicts with the
United States GATT obligations.2'
17 Id. at 1365-69. The Agency argued that the Associations' interpretation of the
PPIA violated the GATT, the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and
the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Id. at 1365. The court held that if the
PPIA violated the GATT, it did so as the result of a policy choice Congress made. Id. at
1367 Consequently, the court refused to interfere with what it viewed as a policy dispute
between Congress and the Executive Branch. Id.
The Fifth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc, thereby vacating the panel opinion,
and a majority of the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the poultry associations. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 310 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en bane). The majority agreed with the panel's conclusion that the Agency's
interpretation of "the same as" was impermissible. Id. at 300-05. The en banc opinion
focused solely on the proper statutory interpretation of "the same as" and did not address
the GATT issue. Nonetheless, the panel opinion is significant because it illustrates the
confusion and uncertainty that exist regarding the status of GATT obligations when they
potentially conflict with subsequent federal laws.
18. Mississippi Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1365-68 (holding that Congress may violate
GATT without clear expression of intent to do so).
19. See mfra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing authority of Congress to
supersede existing international obligations of United States).
20. See mfra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing rule of construction when
statute and international agreement may conflict).
21. See Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365 (5th Cir.)
(holding that rules of construction for statutes implicating international obligations were not
applicable to present case), amended, 9 F.3d 1113, 1114 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d
1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The court identified three maxims of statutory construction
that govern when a statute collides with an international obligation. Id. The three maxims
are: (1) Congress must clearly state its intention to abrogate a treaty or international
obligation of the United States; (2) Congress must clearly state its intent to apply domestic
law extraterritonally; and (3) courts should not construe an act of Congress in a manner that
violates the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Id. According to the
court, these maxims were not applicable in Mississippi Poultry because Congress in enacting
DOMESTIC LEGAL STATUS OF THE GATT4
In light of Mississippi Poultry, this Note analyzes the status of the
GATT relative to other international obligations of the United States. Part
I begins by examining the domestic legal status of international treaties and
agreements generally in the United States. Part II continues, with an
examination of the general rule of statutory construction when subsequent
domestic legislation potentially conflicts with existing international
obligations.
Part 111 analyzes the GATT and its status in United States domestic
law This Part first identifies the GATT's origins and examnes the GATT
in general. The discussion then focuses on the GATT's domestic legal
status and concludes that the GATT operates as a valid congressional-
executive agreement.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the panel opinion in Mississippi Poultry
Tius Part begins with a review of prior cases involving a potential conflict
between an act of Congress and the GATT Part IV continues with an
analysis of the panel opinion and suggests an alternative course the panel
could have taken in deciding Mississippi Poultry This Note concludes by
suggesting that the panel opinion failed to account adequately for the
GATT's significance as the primary instrument of United States trade policy
and that GATT obligations deserve the same deference as other internation-
al obligations when there is a potential conflict with domestic law
I1. Interaction Between International Obligations and Domestic Law
A. Status of International Treaties and Agreements
Federal statutes and self-executing treaties have equal status under
United States domestic law I They have equal authority as federal
the PPIA did not abrogate the GATT, apply domestic law extraterritorially, or violate the
law of nations. Id. at 1366-67 In finding that the first maxim did not apply, the court held
that Congress didnot abrogate, but merely violated the GATT. Id. at 1366.
22. See Whitney v Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (stating that Constitution
places treaty on equal footing with act of legislation); HENKIN, supra note 7, at 163-64
(citing Whitney m support of proposition that statutes and treaties are equal); Louis Henkm,
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV 1555, 1563 (1984)
(discussing relation between federal statutes and treaties for purposes of later-m-tume rule);
David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and American
Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377, 387 (1992) (stating that international agreement
has same domestic law status as statutes).
A self-executing treaty does not require an implementing act of Congress to operate
domestically See HENKIN, supra note 7, at 157-58 (discussing difference between self-
executing treaties and non-self-executing treaties).
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law, and both are superior to state law I The Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution provides the basis for the conclusion that federal statutes
and treaties are equal in status and authority 24 The Supremacy Clause
states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States wich shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby 2
Equality of treaties and federal statutes does not inevitably follow from
this language. 26  However, one can plausibly argue that the language
implies equality, and courts and commentators almost umversally have
accepted this argument.27
23. Henkin, supra note 22, at 1563.
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
26. See HENKiN, supra note 7, at 163 (stating that conclusion that federal statutes and
treaties are equal does not inevitably follow from Supremacy Clause).
27 See d. at 164 (stating that equality of statutes and treaties in domestic law seems
established).
Customary international law, or the "law of nations," is incorporated as domestic
law, even though neither the Constitution nor any act of Congress expressly provides that
customary law shall be incorporated. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
(stating that "[i]nternational law is part of our law"); Henkin, supra note 22, at 1557
(stating that both state and federal courts have treated customary international law as
incorporated since national beginnings). Like treaties, customary law has status equal to
that of an act of Congress for domestic purposes. Id. at 1566. Professor Henkin states
that while the co-equal status of customary law is not authoritatively established, "[tihe
obligations of the United States under customary law are of the same status as its treaty
obligations." Id. at 1564-65; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv 1007, 1026 (1989) (stating that international law and
treaties of United States are supreme law of land).
Henkin argues that customary international law is self-executing domestic law
Henkin, supra note 22, at 1557 Law that is self-executing is enforceable even without
congressional enactment or implementation. Id. at 1561. Treaties may be either self-
executing or non-self-executing. Id. at n.25. The distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing law is important for determining the legal status of inter-
national obligations created through executive agreements, as well as treaties. See
Jackson, GA7T in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 285-86 (arguing that GATT is not self-
executing agreement).
1486
DOMESTIC LEGAL STATUS OF THE GAIT
Like treaties, executive agreements may operate as domestic law '
In fact, most of the United States international agreements are in the form
of executive agreements.2 9 Unlike treaties,30 however, executive agree-
ments have no explicit constitutional basis. 3' Four principal methods exist
whereby executive agreements become domestic law 32 First, Congress
may enact a statute subsequent to the agreement giving the President
authority to accept the agreement or confirming what the President has
already done. 33 Second, Congress may pass a statute in advance authoriz-
ing the President to negotiate and enter into an international agreement.34
Third, an existing treaty may delegate to the President limited authority
to enter into executive agreements that implement the treaty 15 Fourth, the
President may enter into an executive agreement under some inherent
constitutional authority 36 Applying executive agreements to domestic law
can be a confusing exercise,37 due in part to the variety of ways in which
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115 cmt. a (1986) (discussing operation of § 115 and status of international obligations)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; Henkin, supra note 22, at 1565 (stating that President,
in exercising constitutional authority, makes law alone through executive agreement).
According to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), "[a]cts of Congress, treaties, and other
international agreements of the United States are all federal law, § 111." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra, § 115 cmt. a (emphasis added).
29. See Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. I. INT'L L. 479, 496-97 (1990) (stating that
executive agreements are most common form of U.S. international agreement).
30. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 62 (describing manner
m which treaties are handled for domestic law purposes). A treaty becomes law when the
Senate approves the treaty, and the President ratifies it. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 303 (describing methods by which
executive agreements may operate as domestic law); JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
supra note 3, at 63 (same); Brand, supra note 29, at 482-83, 493 (same).






37 See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 64 (stating that
application of international agreements to domestic law creates great deal of confusion);
Brand, supra note 29, at 494 (stating that executive agreements present more difficult
problem than treaties for domestic law purposes); Wirth, supra note 22, at 389-90
(describing domestic status of executive agreement lacking statutory authorization as
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such agreements may become enforceable for domestic purposes.3" Some
executive agreements that qualify under the fourth method operate as
domestic law without congressional action.39 Agreements classified under
the first three methods may operate as the law of the United States, but
only as a result of actions taken by both Congress and the President.'
B. Later-n-Time Rule
The later-m-time rule serves as a mechanism to determine precedence
between statutes and self-executing treaties.4 The later-in-time rule
provides that "[a]n act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of
international law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the
United States."'42 Accordingly, Congress may enact legislation that super-
sedes a prior treaty or agreement,43 and the Supreme Court will sanction
"cloudy"). Professor Brand states that the fact executive agreements have no constitutional
foundation "makes the rules applicable to executive agreements somewhat less certain than
the rules applicable to treaty law or statutory law." Brand, supra note 29, at 498.
38. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing how executive
agreements operate as domestic law).
39. See Henkin, supra note 22, at 1565 (stating that President may make law alone
through executive agreement under constitutional authority). But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 28, § 303 cmt. j (questioning whether sole executive agreement can supersede
earlier federal statute under later-in-time rule). Professor Henkm recognizes that an
executive agreement may not supersede an earlier statute, but states that such a scenario
remains a hypothetical. Henkin, supra note 22, at 1565 n.36.
40. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (describing requirements that
executive agreements must satisfy to become law).
41. Henkm, supra note 22, at 1563.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 115(1)(a).
43. See Brand, supra note 29, at 504 (noting that Congress may supersede treaties
through subsequent legislation); Richard Cummings, The PLO Case: Terrorism, Statutory
Interpretation, and Conflicting Obligations Under Domestic and Public International Law,
13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv 25, 26 (1989) (discussing domestic law status of treaty
when Congress enacts legislation conflicting with that treaty); Henkin, supra note 22, at
1566 (stating that Congress may supersede treaties through subsequent legislation); Robert
E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GA7T in the Domestic Law of the United States, in THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrry AND GATT 187, 191-92 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986) (same);
see also Henkin, supra note 22, at 1568-69 (discussing role of courts in enforcing
international obligations). Professor Henkin contends that the courts will not command
Congress or the President to comply with international obligations if either has rejected that
obligation through a proper exercise of authority Id.
Self-executing treaties may also supersede domestic statutes. See Brand, supra note
29, at 504 n.140 (discussing Supreme Court dicta indicating that treaty may displace
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Congress's rejection of an international obligation by applying the later-m-
time rule.' As a result of the later-in-time rule, a treaty or agreement that
represents an internationally binding obligation of the United States may
have no domestic effect, even if the obligation is self-executing.45
C. Clear-Intent Rule of Construction
The primary limitation on the later-in-time rule is that Congress must
clearly express an intent to supersede an existing international obligation.46
Under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (Restatement (Third)), "[w]here fairly possible, a United States
statute).
44. See Chae Chan Ping v United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 599-602 (1889) (finding clear legislative intent to abrogate previous treaty, and giving
effect to that intent); Edye v Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597-99
(1884) (same); HENKmN, supra note 7, at 164 (stating that courts regularly give effect to acts
of Congress inconsistent with existing treaty).
45: See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 115 cmt. a (stating that conflicting
domestic statute would place United States in violation of international law); HENKIN, supra
note 7, at 164 (same); Henkin, supra note 22, at 1568 (same). Professor Henkin states that
Congress does not repeal a treaty, but "legislates without regard to the international
obligations of the United States." HENKIN, supra note 7, at 164. The treaty obligations
remain valid, but conflicting legislation "compels the United States to go into default." Id.
According to Professor Cummings, the later-in-time doctrine obscures international treaty
obligations that remain "binding on the international level but only conditionally operative
on the domestic level." Cummings, supra note 43, at 26.
46. See United States v Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F Supp. 1456, 1471
(S.D.N.Y 1988) (holding that Congress did not intend to violate U.N. Headquarters
Agreement by enacting Anti-Terrorism Act); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 114
(stating that courts should construe federal statute so as not to conflict with international
obligations of United States); Eskridge, supra note 27, at 1026-27 (noting that courts
construe statutes consistently with international law unless clear indications exist that
Congress meant to supersede earlier agreement); Henkin, supra note 22, at 1558 n.15
(noting that courts have 'long assumed that Congress intended to act consistently with
international law and have "construed statutes accordingly"); Jackson, GA7T in U.S. Law,
supra note 3, at 293 n.239 (asserting that attempt to construe consistently will be made when
legislation and executive agreement conflict); Dorothy 3. Black, Note, International Trade
v. Environmental Protection: The Case of the U.S. Embargo on Mexican Tuna, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 123, 140 (1992) (stating that Congress may violate treaty obligations so
long as intent is clear); Andrew R. Home, Note, U.S. v Palestine Liberation Organization:
Continued Confusion m Congressional Intent and the Hierarchy of Norms, 10 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 935, 947 (1989) (finding that presumption that Congress would not surreptitiously violate
international obligations is part of original foundations of American jurisprudence).
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statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or
with an international agreement of the United States."47 The Supreme
Court has traditionally and consistently applied this canon of construc-
tion.48 Moreover, cases applying this canon indicate that courts should
construe federal statutes consistently with executive agreements, as well
as treaties and customary law 49 This is important because the GATT is
an executive agreement. 0
In United States v Palestine Liberation Organization," the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
47 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 114.
48. See Weinberger v Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982) (holding that Congress did
not intend to repudiate executive agreement providing for preferential employment of
Filipino citizens at U.S. military bases m Philippines); Washington v Washington State
Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (expressing reluctance to find
abrogation of treaty rights without clear statutory instruction), modified, 444 U.S. 816
(1979); McCulloch v Sociedad Nacional de Marmeros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963) (finding no clearly expressed congressional intent to extend National Labor Relations
Act to maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen); Clark v Allen,
331 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1947) (holding that act prohibiting removal of money or property
from United States by German nationals did not conflict with prior treaty granting right of
inheritance for German nationals); United States v. Cook, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (stating
that Congress must express clear intent to abrogate or modify treaty); Chew Heong v
United States, 112 U.S. 536, 550 (1884) (holding that unless Congress declared intent in
unmistakable terms, it did not intend to violate treaty allowing certain class of Chinese
laborers to go to and from this country); Murray v The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that courts should not construe act of Congress to violate
"law of nations" if possible alternative construction exists).
49. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982) (applying clear-intent canon
to executive agreement); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marmeros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 114 (stating that
courts should construe statute so as not to conflict with international agreement of United
States). The Supreme Court in Weinberger construed a statute prohibiting discriminatory
employment practices on U.S. military installations consistently with a 1947 executive
agreement entered into with the Republic of the Philippines, even though the agreement
provided for preferential employment of Filipino citizens at United States military facilities
in the Philippines. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32-33. The statute prohibited discrimination
in hiring civilian personnel "'[ulnless prohibited by treaty '" Id. at 28. The Court held that
the word "treaty" could have more than one meaning and that Congress here intended for
"treaty" to include executive agreements. Id. at 29, 36.
50. See Brand, supra note 29, at 483 (stating that GATT is valid under U.S. law only
as congressional-executive agreement); supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing
status of GATT).
51. 695 F Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y 1988).
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Anti-Terronsm Act of 19872 (ATA) did not supersede the Agreement
Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding
the Headquarters of the United Nations53 (Headquarters Agreement).5' In
1974, pursuant to the Headquarters Agreement, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) became an observer at the United Nations.55 In
October 1986, members of Congress, upset at the presence of PLO offices
m the United States, requested that the United States Department of State
close the PLO offices. 56 When the State Department denied this request,
these members of Congress introduced the ATA.57 The ATA forbade the
presence of PLO offices or facilities m the United States if such offices or
facilities were intended to further the interests of the PLO 58 The Justice
Department argued that the ATA required the closure of the PLO
Observer Mission at the United Nations.59 Because the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation of the ATA conflicted directly with the Headquarters
Agreement, the district court sought a different construction that would
reconcile the ATA with the Headquarters Agreement.' The court,
applying the clear-intent rule of construction, found that Congress did not
intend to contravene the Headquarters Agreement.6' The ATA mentioned
neither the Permanent Observer Mission nor the Headquarters Agreement,
52. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (1988).
53. G.A. Res. 169 (11), 11 U.N.T.S. 11, No. 147 (1947).
54. United States v Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F Supp. 1456, 1471 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
55. Id. at 1459.
56. Id. at 1459-60.
57 Id. at 1460.
58. Id. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA) provides:
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the Palestine
Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any
of those, or any agents thereof, on or after the effective date of this chapter-
(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or
maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments
within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction of, or
with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its
constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof.
22 U.S.C. § 5202 (1988).
59. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F Supp. at 1464.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1465.
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and this omission led the court to conclude that Congress did not clearly
express an intent to violate the Headquarters Agreement.62 The court's
construction of the ATA m Palestine Liberation Organization is illustrative
of the extent to which some courts have been willing to apply the clear-
intent rule of construction. 63
Iff. The GA7T
A. Background
Despite the significance of the GATT in shaping international
economic relations, ' it never has achieved formal status as a treaty I In
1946, the newly formed Umted Nations, acting through a subordinate
body, adopted a proposal to create an International Trade Organization
(ITO).6 The negotiations over the ITO eventually gave birth to the
GATT, initially as a temporary measure.' Due principally to the failure
62. Id. at 1468-71. The lack of any unequivocal guidance in the legislative history of
the ATA and the longstanding practice under the language of the Headquarters Agreement
supported the court's conclusion that the ATA did not include the Headquarters Agreement.
Id.
63. Compare Cummings, supra note 43, at 69 (concluding that district court properly
construed ATA so as not to conflict with Headquarters Agreement) and W Michael
Reisman, An International Farce: The Sad Case of the PLO Mission, 14 YALE J. INT'L L.
412, 431 (1989) (stating that judicial approach m PLO case was innovative) and Beth
DeBernardi, Note, Congressional Intent and Conflicting Treaty Obligations: United States
v Palestine Liberation Organization, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 83, 105 (1990) (stating that
district court's decision was "thoughtful and conscientious") and Home, supra note 46, at
954 (concluding that district court's reasoning was flawed, but result was correct) with M.A.
Thomas, When the Guests Move In: Permanent Observers to the United Nations Gain the
Right to Establish Permanent Missions m the United States, 78 CAL. L. REv 197, 244-45
(1990) (criticizing PLO decision for its judicial activist approach and for ignoring
"constitutional balance" between executive and legislative branches in "treaty making
process").
64. See supra notes 1, 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing role GATT occupies in
governing international trade relations).
65. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 27
66. Id. at 32; see also JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW O1 GATT 42-
46 (1969) (discussing preparatory meetings held from 1946 to 1948 to draft GATT and ITO
charter).
67 See JACKSON, supra note 66, at 42-46 (discussing negotiations over ITO);
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 32 (same). Beginning m October of
1946, meetings dedicated to drafting an ITO charter took place. Id. The drafters held the
principal meeting from April to November 1947 and divided this meeting into three parts.
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of the United States Congress to grant approval, the ITO never came into
being.6" The GATT, however, taking on a life of its own, became the
primary forum for handling trade problems.69
Although the GATT has not come into force technically as a treaty,
it operates as a treaty obligation under international law through the
Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA).7" The PPA secures implemen-
tation of the GATT 7' Nations that sign the PPA agree to apply Part II of
the GATT "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legisla-
tion."' The "existing legislation" language is significant because it allows
Id. The first part involved preparing a charter for the ITO, the second part involved
negotiation of multilateral tariff reductions, and the third part focused on "drafting the
'general clauses' of obligations relating to the tariff obligations." Id. The final two parts
of the 1947 meeting constitute the GATT. Id. For a comprehensive summary of the
formation and history of the GATT, see generally id. at 27-39.
68. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 34. The United States was
the dominant economic power in the world during the drafting of the ITO, and the other
countries involved in forming the ITO did not want an ITO which did not include the United
States. Id. Therefore, the United States effectively buried the ITO when President Truman
announced at the end of 1950 his decision not to seek congressional approval. Id.
69. See id. at 37 (discussing how GATT filled vacuum when ITO did not come into
being); JACKSON, supra note 66, at 49-53 (discussing end of ITO and subsequent
development of GATT).
The GATT contains several obligations, "some of which have been further elaborated
through separate treaty instruments often called 'codes.'" John H. Jackson, National
Treatment Obligations and Non-TariffBarriers, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 207 (1989). A
primary GATT obligation that member nations agree to "is the 'tariff binding' which sets
a maximum tariff rate for massive lists of products." Id. Including the Uruguay Round,
there have been eight major trade negotiating rounds, "mostly concerned with negotiating
the tariff bindings." Id. at 208.
70. See JACKSON, supra note 66, at 59 (discussing general features of GATT);
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing GATT and
PPA).
71. See JACKSON, supra note 66, at 60 (stating that all original contracting parties
apply GATT by virtue of PPA); JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 35-36
(discussing how PPA was solution to problem of bringing GATT into force).
72. GATT, supra note 2, 55 U.N.T.S. at 308. The PPA provides in part:
1. The Governments undertake, provided that this Protocol shall have been
signed on behalf of all the foregoing Governments not later than November 15,
1947, to apply provisionally on and after January, 1 1948:
(a) Parts I and I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and
(b) Part II of that Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with
existing legislation.
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nations to bypass legislative or parliamentary approval and agree to the
GATT through the exercise of executive authority 71
B. Status Under United States Domestic Law
The GAT does not operate as a treaty of the United States because
the Senate never provided "advice and consent."74 Accordingly, whatever
status the GATT has as the law of the United States exists on the basis of
its status as a congressional-executive agreement. 5  Professor John
Jackson contends that the GATT is a valid congressional-executive
agreement because the President proclaimed the GATT pursuant to
authority Congress delegated in the 1945 Amendments to the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act of 1934.76 However, Jackson's conclusion that the
Id., see also JACKSON, supra note 66, at 60-63 (discussing PPA); JACKSON, WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 36 (discussing how nations implement GATT through
PPA). The exception to GATT adherence is referred to as the "grandfather rights" or
"existing legislation" exception. Id.
Part I contains the tariff concessions. Id. Part II contains the principal nontariff
obligations, including provisions for customs procedures, quotas, subsidies, and antidumping
duties. See it. at 36 (discussing how implementation operates through PPA). For a detailed
analysis of the substantive obligations of the GATT and the manner m which they operate,
see generally JACKSON, supra note 66, at 193-534.
73. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 36 (stating that most
governments would need to submit GATT for legislative approval without "existing
legislation" provision); JACKSON, supra note 66,.at 62 (discussing inclusion of "existing
legislation" provision m final draft of GATT). At the Geneva meeting, the drafters asked
all participating delegations whether their respective governments could adopt the GATT.
Id. Most governments could agree to lower tariffs through executive authority, but could
not agree to the removal of certain nontariff barriers and general matters, primarily
contained in Part II, without parliamentary approval. Id. The "existing legislation" clause
sought to allow governments to give immediate effect to the GATT without deleting the
nontariff provisions. Id.
74. See Brand, supra note 29, at 483 (stating that GATT does not operate as treaty
because Senate never gave advice and consent); Jackson, GATT in U.S. Law, supra note 3,
at 253, 265 (same).
75. See Brand, supra note 29, at 483 (stating that GATT can validly operate under
U.S. law only as congressional-executive agreement).
76. See Jackson, GA7T m U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 255-73 (discussing presidential
proclamation of GATT under 1945 amendments to Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934). Winthrop Brown, acting with full powers, signed the Protocol on behalf of the
United States. Id. at 253 n.22. President Truman subsequently proclaimed all provisions
of the GATT. Proclamation No. 2761A, 12 Fed. Reg. 8863, 8866 (1947). Truman claimed
authority to proclaim the GATT from the 1945 Amendments to a 1934 Act (Trade Agree-
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1945 Amendments gave the President the authority to bind the United
States to the GATT has not garnered umversal acceptance.'
ments Act) that amended the 1930 Tariff Act to facilitate foreign trade. See id. (citing
Trade Agreements Act as basis for entering GATT). The Trade Agreements Act, in
amending § 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, authorized the President to enter into trade
agreements with foreign governments and to proclaim modifications m existing law
regarding tariffs and foreign trade in accordance with such trade agreements. Act of June
12, 1934, cl. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354 (1988)). The
Act of 1934 provided:
(a) the President is authorized from time to time-
(1) To enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments or
instrumentalities thereof; and
(2) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other inport
restrictions, or such additional import restrictions, or such continuance, and
for such minimum periods, of existing customs or excise treatment of any
article covered by foreign trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to
carry out any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into
hereunder.
Id. Congress, m the 1945 Amendments to the Trade Agreements Act, extended the
President's authority to enter into and proclaim foreign trade agreements for a period of
three years. Act of July 5, 1945, ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410 (current version codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354 (1988)).
According to Professor Jackson, the 1945 Amendments delegated to the President
statutory authority to bind the United States to the GAT. See Jackson, GATT in U.S. Law,
supra note 3, at 273 (stating that it is fairly clear that President had statutory authority to
enter GATT). Jackson states that the two primary legal attacks on the proposition that
adherence to the GATT is properly based on the Trade Agreements Act are that the Act
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power and that the GATT was beyond the scope of
authority delegated by the Act. Id. at 256-57 Jackson quickly dismisses the first attack,
but experiences difficulty in addressing the second. Id. at 257
After analyzing the statutory language, the legislative history, and prior trade
agreements that dealt with provisions similar to those in the GATT, Jackson concludes that
the Trade Agreements Act delegated to the President the authority to proclaim the GATT.
Id. at 273. For a more m-depth look at Jackson's analysis, see id. at 259-70 (discussing
validity of presidential authority to enter GATT under Trade Agreements Act).
77 See Hudec, supra note 43, at 199 n.41 (commenting on Jackson's effort to
establish GATT's domestic legal status). The GATT is a multinational agreement, and the
primary attack on the authority of the President to enter into and proclaim the GATT under
the Trade Agreements Act rests on the fact that neither the Trade Agreements Act nor the
1945 Amendments expressly delegated power to the President to enter into a multilateral
agreement. See Brand, supra note 29, at 484 (stating that neither 1945 nor 1934 Acts
explicitly grant authority to President to enter into multilateral agreements); Jackson, GAIT
in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 257-58 (acknowledging argument that Trade Agreements Act
does not apply to multilateral agreements). All previous trade agreements negotiated under
the Trade Agreements Act, with one exception, were bilateral agreements. See Brand,
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Congress never has been entirely comfortable or enamored with the
GATT 78 Congressional suspicion of the GATT results m part from the
inherent tension between the executive and legislative branches in the area
of international economic relations. 9 Traditionally, the President plays the
preeminent role in the conduct of foreign affairs." The Constitution,
however, grants Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce,8" and
members of Congress guard this power jealously I Congress's reluctance
supra note 29, at 484 (stating that with exception of agreement made with Belgo-Luxembourg
Economic Union, all agreements negotiated under Trade Agreements Act have been bilateral);
Jackson, GAIT in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 258 (same). This does not necessarily refute
Jackson's contention that the Trade Agreements Act authorized the President to enter into and
proclaim the GATT. See id. at 258-59 (arguing that Trade Agreements Act does not preclude
multilateral agreements). Jackson points out that the legislative history of the 1945 Amend-
ments contained statements referrng to the Trade Agreements Act "as one of several postwar
economic policy building blocks, side by side with such others as the Bretton-Woods Agree-
ments, which did set up two multilateral organizations." Id. at 258. While admitting that
Congress may have been surprised when the executive branch entered into multilateral tariff
negotiations with 15 other nations, Jackson argues that the Trade Agreements Act did not
explicitly prohibit multilateral agreements. Id. at 259. Nonetheless, the multilateral nature
of the GATT draws Jackson's contention into question. See Brand, supra note 29, at 484 n.25
(stating that some commentators have considered Jackson's argument to be "less than
convincing"). Professor Hudec concludes that Jackson's detailed analysis of the authority
granted by the Trade Agreements Act, rather than closing the door on the question of whether
the Trade Agreements Act delegated the President authority to enter into and proclaim the
GATT, demonstrates that no clear source of specific authority existed for the GAIT as a con-
gressional-executive agreement at the time the GATT came into existence. See Hudec, supra
note 43, at 199 n.41 (commenting on Jackson's analysis of GATT's domestic legal status).
78. See John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of
Changing International Economc Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv 267, 344-45 (1982) (discussing
congressional hostility to GATT and noting that for several decades Congress refused officially
to recognize GATT); John J. Reinke, Note, An Analysis of the Conflicts Between Congressio-
nal Import Quotas and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
734, 745 (1986) (stating that Congress is hostile to GATT because Congress did not ratify
GATT).
79. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSIEM, supra note 3, at 61 (noting tension between
Congress and President regarding respective roles in area of foreign affairs); Jackson, supra
note 78, at 341-42 (discussing tension between Congress and President resulting from
separation of powers); Reinke, supra note 78, at 745 (stating that frictions between executive
and legislative branches impede implementation of GATT).
80. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 61-62 (stating that
Congress enjoys reminding President of special powers Congress exercises in matters of
international trade).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I,-§ 8.
82. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 62 (stating that Congress
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to embrace the GATT is due, in large part, to the fact that Congress never
explicitly approved the GATT 8
Despite its hesitancy about the GATT, however, Congress has never
rejected the GATT explicitly I In fact, during the first two decades of the
GATT's existence, Congress rarely mentioned the GATT, and when it did,
it generally took a neutral position.' Moreover, in the last twenty years,
congressional enactments regarding matters of international trade reflect an
implicit acceptance of the GATT I Professor Ronald Brand argues that the
reserves special power over matters of international trade and enjoys reminding executive
branch of this power); Jackson, supra note 78, at 341-42 (stating that congressional power to
regulate foreign commerce limits "Presidential foreign affairs power").
83. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing fact that GATT did not receive
Senate advice and consent); supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
reluctance, as well as hostility, regarding GATT).
84. See Brand, supra note 29, at 485 (stating that Congress has carefully avoided explicit
approval or rejection of GATT).
85. See id. (discussing provisions in 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956 acts extending
President's power to negotiate trade agreements that staked out neutral position on GATT);
Jackson, GAYT in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 267 (same).
86. See Brand, supra note 29, at 485, 501-02 (discussing Irade Act of 1974 and
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988). Professor Brand states that Congress has
tempered its reluctance to accept the GAIT since the Trade Act of 1974. Id. at 501. For
instance, the Trade Act of 1974 implicitly recognized the GATT as a binding trade agreement
of the United States, and instructed the President to take whatever actions that were necessary
to bring the GAIT into conformity with certain foreign trade principles enumerated in the Act.
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 121(a), 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (current version at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1988)). Furthermore, the 1974 Act authorized an annual appropriation
of the sums necessary to cover the United States share of GATT expenses and instructed the
President to comply with balance of payment restrictions set out in the GATT. Id. §§ 121(d),
122(a) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2132 (1988)); see also Brand, supra note 29, at
485 (discussing 1974 Act).
Despite these indications of approval, Congress reiterated that the 1974 Act "does not
imply approval or disapproval" of the GATT. Trade Act § 121(d) (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 2131 (1988)). Moreover, Congress took a tougher stand against the GATT in the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat.
144 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1988)). The 1979 Act provided that no
provision of the GATT that conflicts with any statute enacted by Congress "shall be given
effect under the laws of the United States." Trade Agreements Act § 3 (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 2504 (1988)).
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (1988),
provided the clearest indication of congressional acceptance of the GATT. See Brand, supra
note 29, at 501 (stating that 1988 Act implies GATT's "full legal status"). In the 1988 Act,
Congress, rather than qualifying its support for the GATT, made several positive references
to the GAIT. See td. (discussing various positive references to GATT contained in 1988 Act).
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GATT has full legal status in the United States because Congress has
consistently acquiesced in prolonged Umted States participation in the
GATT 87
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion In Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v Sawyer8 lends support to the conclusion that the GATT has full
legal status in the United States. 9 In Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter
wrote: "[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and never before questioned may be treated as
Some of the positive references Brand identified are provisions "ensuring that GATT
mechanisms provide for effective and expeditious dispute settlement, enhancing the status
of the GATT," and "improving the operation and extending the coverage of the GATT."
Id., see also 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988).
Most observers expect Congress to approve the agreements resulting from the recently
concluded Uruguay Round. See Friedman, supra note 6, at D8 (noting that President
Clinton and senior lawmakers are optimistic that Congress will approve GATT). Beginning
in 1995, the new agreement would bring agriculture, financial services, and intellectual
property under GATT rules for the first time; eliminate tariffs on thousands of products; and
create a permanent institution consisting of GATT members that would enforce trade rules.
Peter Behr, 117 Nations' Representatives Approve Historic Trade Pact, WASH. POST, Dec.
16, 1993, at A41.
87 See Brand, supra note 29, at 502 (stating that combination of prolonged U.S.
participation m GATT and congressional acquiescence to that participation demonstrate that
GATT has full legal status); see also Jackson, GAYT in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 260
(arguing that all three branches of government currently recognize legal status of GATT).
Jackson, m arguing that the Trade Agreements Act granted the President authority to enter
into and proclaim the GATT, states that one of the "most telling arguments" supporting the
validity of the GATT is "the passage of time." Id.
88. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
89. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952). In
Youngstown, the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of President Truman's
Executive Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the
nation's steel mills. Id. at 582. The steel mill owners argued that the President's order
amounted to lawmaking and, therefore, usurped Congress's legislative powers. Id. In
response, the Government argued that a potential nationwide steelworkers strike threatened
the Korean War effort and that the President in issuing the order exercised his constitutional
powers as the nation's Chief Executive and Commander in Chief. Id. The Supreme Court
held that the President's power to issue the order could originate only from an act of
Congress or the Constitution. Id. at 585. According to the Court, no act of Congress
explicitly or implicitly authorized the President to seize the steel mills. Id. at 585-86.
Moreover, the Court held that neither the President's military power as Commander in Chief
nor his executive power under the Constitution could sustain the order to seize the steel
mills. Id. at 587-89. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia's judgment voiding the seizure order. Id. at 589.
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a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II. "1
A "long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress"
raises the presumption that the executive branch has acted with Congress's
consent. 91 As Professor Brand argues, the United States prolonged, active
participation m the GATT constitutes a "long-continued practice, known to
and acquiesced in by Congress."' Despite problems with Jackson's
contention that the 1930 Tariff Act, with the 1934 and 1945 Amendments,
delegated authority to the President to enter into and proclaim the GATT,
congressional actions since 1974 indicate that Congress has resolved any
doubts about the GATT I Accordingly, the GATT operates implicitly, if
not explicitly, as a valid congressional-executive agreement.
94
IV Analysis
Along with the President and Congress, federal courts have played a
major role in shaping the GATT's domestic legal status. 5 Although
commentators may disagree about how the GATT operates as domestic law,
it is clear that most courts m this country assume that the GATT is binding
domestic law I This assumption appears valid in light of the actions that
the President and Congress have taken since the GATT's inception.' The
panel opinion m Mississippi Poultry does not question the binding character
of the GATT, but does question whether the rule that courts should
90. Id. at 610-11.
91. Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting United States v
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)).
92. Brand, supra note 29, at 500-01 (quoting Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 686 (1981) (quoting United States v Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915))).
93. See id. at 501 (stating that Congress has overcome its reluctance and resolved its
questions regarding GATT).
94. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686-87 (finding implicit delegation of authority
to President to issue executive order blocking Iraman assets in United States and staying any
judicial proceedings against Iran in U.S. courts).
95. See Brand, supra note 29, at 486 (noting importance of case law in shaping
GATT's "domestic law status").
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, pt. VIII, ch. 1, introductory note at 265;
see also Brand, supra note 29, at 486-93 (discussing case law regarding status of GATT).
Brand examines several cases in which the validity of the GATT was a primary or
peripheral issue and concludes that these cases "indicate judicial support for the 'binding
character' of the GATT." Id. at 486.
97 See supra notes 74-94 and accompanying text (discussing GATT's status in U.S.
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construe acts of Congress consistently with international obligations applies
when subsequent federal legislation potentially conflicts with the GATT 98
An examination of prior cases involving federal law that allegedly violated
GATT obligations raises doubts about the validity of the court's conclusion
on this point.99
A. Prior Case Law
The United States Customs Court in Bercut-Vandervoort & Co. v
United States"° followed a common approach for resolving conflicts
between federal law and the GATT 10, In Bercut, importers of ninety-proof
gin challenged a 1951 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
(IRC).'1 The IRC taxed distilled spirits below fifty percent alcoholic
content (below proof) at a higher rate than distilled spirits above fifty
percent alcoholic content (above proof).'"3  Plaintiffs argued that the
IRC violated the GATT's prohibition against discriminatory internal taxes"°
because importers of below proof alcohol had to pay the higher tax, but
domestic producers could subject their product to the tax when the alcohol
was above proof, and then redistill the alcohol for sale below proof."5
98. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing court's holding in Mississippi
Poultry that Congress does not have to express clearly its intent to violate GATT).
99. But cf. Hudec, supra note 43, at 210-18 (discussing court decisions involving
conflict between GATT and federal law and concluding that no decision has ever proclaimed
GATT's superiority over federal law). Professor Hudec's analysis focused on the question
of whether federal law is superior to the GATT and did not discuss the applicability of the
clear-intent canon to conflicts between federal law and the GATE. Id.
100. 151 F Supp. 942 (Cust. Ct. 1957).
101. See Bercut-Vandervoort & Co. v. United States, 151 F Supp. 942, 946 (Cust. Ct.
1957) (holding that tax assessed on imported proof alcohol did not contravene GATE).
102. Id. at 942-43.
103. Id. at 944-45.
104. GATT, supra note 2, art. 3, § 2, 62 U.N.T.S. at 82. Article 3, § 2 provides:
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind m excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
Id.
105. Bercut, 151 F Supp. at 945-48. After distillation, domestically produced alcohol
went into packages or storage tanks in bonded warehouses. Id. at 944. The government
levied the internal tax when the producer removed the alcohol from bond. Id. at 943
(quoting Internal Revenue Code). Domestic producers could remove the alcohol when it
1500
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The court held that the IRC did not distinguish between foreign and
domestically produced alcohol and, therefore, did not contravene the
GATT 1" Moreover, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim-that the
United States should tax imported below proof alcohol as if the alcdhol
were above proof at the time of importation-violated the statutory scheme
and discrimnated against domestic producers, a result the GATT did not
endorse. 7 Finally, the court held that because Congress enacted this
statutory scheme on more than one occasion, both before and after the
GATT came into existence, and because the relevant GATT provisions were
general in nature, the GATT provisions were intended to be consistent with
the IRC. 108
By construing the GATT to be consistent with the statute, the court
appeared to turn the clear-intent rule on its head."°  The Restatement
(Third) instructs courts to construe the statute, not the treaty or obligation,
consistently "I Nonetheless, the court did strain to find harmony between
the GATT and the IRC. I
was above proof, pay the tax, and then redistill the alcohol and sell at below proof. Id. at
947 Foreign alcohol was taxed at the time it was imported. Id. at 944. Thus, the only
way a foreign producer could similarly avoid taxation was to establish a plant for processing
and packaging in the United States or to sell the above proof alcohol in bulk to a domestic
purchaser who would then process and package it. Id. at 947
106. Id. at 946.
107 Id. at 947-48. The court held that the plaintiffs' scheme would break down the
explicit statutory classifications because imported underproof alcohol and imported overproof
alcohol would be subject to the same tax rate. Id. at 947 Moreover, the court held that
the plaintiffs' theory discriminated against the domestic producer because "the foreign
product would pay internal revenue tax on the proof-gallon basis on the quantity
actually entered or withdrawn for consumption, whereas domestic merchandise would pay
the tax on the quantity withdrawn, whether or not all of that quantity were processed and
sold for consumption." Id. at 948. The court stated that the GATT did not intend to
discriminate against domestic producers. Id.
108. Id. at 947
109. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (stating that courts should construe
statute consistently with international agreement).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 28, § 114 (stating that courts should
construe frderal statute so as not to conflict with international obligations of United States).
111. Judge Donlon, in his dissent, also construed the Revenue Code to avoid conflict
with the GATT, although he did so in a much different manner and reached a much
different result from the majority Bercut-Vandervoort & Co. v United States, 151 F
Supp. 942, 948-53 (Cust. Ct. 1957) (Donlon, J., dissenting). Donlon found merit in the
plaintiffs' argument that the tax amounted to the type of indirect discrimination prohibited
by the GATT. Id. at 948. According to Donlon, it was a regular "practice of the domestic
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The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in United States v Star
Industnes, Inc.ii2 also sought to avoid conflict between a domestic statute
and the GATT 113 President Johnson, responding to high import fees that
the European Economic Community (EEC) had implemented on poultry,
issued Proclamation No. 3564.114 Proclamation No. 3564 withdrew tariff
concessions on certain products, including brandy, in retaliation against the
EEC pursuant to section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.115
The President chose the products targeted for higher import fees in Proc-
lamation No. 3564 because EEC member nations were the primary export-
ers of those products."' However, Proclamation No. 3564 imposed higher
import duties on brandy imported from Spain, a non-EEC member.
1 7
industry to withdraw gm from bond while it is overproof and unbottled, pay internal tax
on the proof gallon, and, thereafter, merely by adding water and bottling the watered-down
gm," create an underproof commercial gm for sale along with the imported product. Id.
at 949. Donlon found that this practice supported the conclusion that the tax, as applied,
contravened the GATT by indirectly discriminating against foreign importers. Id. at 952.
In the Revenue Act of 1951, Congress provided that "[n]o amendment made by this Act
shall apply in any case where its application would be contrary to any treaty obligation of
the United States." Id. at 951 (quoting § 615 of the Revenue Act of 1951). Donlon
concluded that Congress, through this provision, expressed an intent that the Revenue Act
of 1951 be applied so as not to violate the GATT. Id. at 952. Consequently, Judge Donlon
wanted to remand the case to give the parties the opportunity "to argue as to the method of
applying tax [si] in order to effectuate the intention of Congress." Id. at 953.
112. 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
113. See United States v Star Indus., Inc., 462 F.2d 557, 564 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
(holding that Presidential Proclamation withdrawing tariff concessions on certain products
was valid).
114. Id. at 558-59.
115. Id. at 558-60. Section 252(c) provides:
(c) Whenever a foreign country or instrumentality, the products of which
receive benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States,
maintains unreasonable import restrictions which either directly or indirectly
substantially burden Umted States commerce, the President may, to the extent
that such action is consistent with the purposes of section 1801 of this title,
and having due regard for the international obligations of the United States-
(1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade
agreement concessions to products of such country or instrumentality, or
(2) refram from proclaiming benefits of trade agreement concessions to
carry out a trade agreement with such country or instrumentality
Id. at 560 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1882(c) (1988)).
116. Id. at 559.
117 Id. Prior to Proclamation No. 3564, brandy importers paid a duty of $1.25 per
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Brandy importers from Spain challenged Proclamation No. 3564. They
argued that section 252(c) permitted the President to withdraw tariff
concessions only against offending countries, not equally against all
countries on a most-favored-nation basis."' The government argued that
section 252(c) did allow the President to withdraw concessions on a most-
favored-nation basis." 9
The Customs Court, sustaining the importer's challenge, held that
section 252(c) authorized selective action against an offending "country or
instrumentality," not action on a most-favored-nation basis." In doing so,
the court rejected the argument that requiring the President to act selectively
in withdrawing trade concessions conflicted with GATT obligations.' The
court held that Article XXVIII, paragraph three of the GATT did not
require most-favored-nation treatment." The Customs Court reached this
conclusion because the specific language m Article XXVIII, paragraph three
did not mention or imply such treatment."z Following the lead of the court
m Bercut, the Customs Court construed the GATT, rather than the statute,
to avoid a conflict. 24
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals followed the clear-intent
rule that the Restatement (Third) sets out and construed section 252(c)
consistently with the GATT 11 Even though the specific language of
section 252(c) permitted the withdrawal of concessions to a "country" or
gallon. Id. at 558. Proclamation No. 3564 raised the duty to $5.00 per gallon. Id.
118. Id. at 560. Under most-favored-nation treatment, GATT members treat like
products from all contracting parties alike for tariff purposes. See id. at 561 (citing Article
I of GATT). Therefore, a member nation must withdraw tariff concessions from all parties,
not solely a particular party Id.
119. Id. at 560.
120. Id.
121. Id. The court held that the President did not need to act with "due regard for the
international obligations of the United States" because the GATT did not require most-
favored-nation treatment. Id. (quoting Customs Court).
122. Id. When a contracting party has withdrawn tariff concessions negotiated pursuant
to the GATT, Article XXVIII allows the other contracting parties to make reciprocal
modifications in concessions. GATT, supra note 2, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
123. United States v Star Indus., Inc., 462 F.2d 557, 561 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
124. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing how Bercut court construed
GATT so as not to conflict with Revenue Act).
125. See Star Ldutnes, 462 F.2d at 561-64 (finding that § 252(c) permitted President
to act on most-favored-nation basis). The appellate court, holding that Article XXVIII,
paragraph three, taken in context with the rest of the GATT, required most-favored-nation
treatment, rejected the Customs Court's construction of the GATT. Id. at 562.
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"instrumentality," the court found that the application of most-favored-
nation treatment was consistent with section 252(c)'s instruction to take the
international obligations of the United States into account.' 6 Moreover, the
application of most-favored-nation treatment did not conflict with any of the
general purposes of the statute.127 While the statutory interpretation here
was not as creative as that in Palestine Liberation Organization, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals nevertheless expanded the meaning of
section 252(c) beyond its specific language to avoid conflict with the
GATT 128
United States Steel Corp. v United States29 provides perhaps the
clearest support for the proposition that courts should construe acts of
Congress consistently with the GATT whenever possible. 3 ' In United
States Steel, the plaintiff objected to carbon steel imports from Europe and
filed countervailing duty and antidumping petitions with the International
Trade Adrminstration of the Department of Commerce (ITA).isi The ITA
suspended liquidation pending a final determination of the plaintiff's
petition. 132 Pursuant to section 606 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
the plaintiff requested that the ITA delay the final decision on the
countervailing duty case and consolidate that case with the antidumping
126. Id. at 562-63.
127 Id. The purposes of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 are:
(1) to stimulate the econonuc growth of the United States and maintain and
enlarge foreign markets for the products of United States agriculture, industry,
mining, and commerce;
(2) to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries through the
development of open and nondiscriminatory trading m the free world; and
(3) to prevent Communist economic penetration.
19 U.S.C. § 1801 (1988) (emphasis added).
128. See Brand, supra note 29, at 493 (stating that GATT influenced decision m Star
Industries); supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussing creative statutory
interpretation applied m Palestine Liberation Organization).
129. 618 F Supp. 496 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
130. See United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 618 F Supp. 496, 500-01 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985) (holding that Congress intended suspension of liquidation m countervailing duty
proceedings to be terminated after 120 days to make domestic law consistent with GATT);
Kenneth S. Komoroski, The Failure of Governments to Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under
the GAYT, 10 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 189, 191 n.15 (1988) (citing United States Steel for
proposition that absent clear congressional statement to contrary, courts should read U.S.
law consistently with U.S. obligations under GATT).
131. United States Steel, 618 F Supp. at 498.
132. Id.
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case. '3 The ITA granted this request, but terminated the suspension of
liquidation, fearing that continuation of the suspension would violate the
GATT because it would not make the final determination within 120 days
of the original complaint."4 United States Steel, claiming that section 606
mandated suspension until the ITA made a final determination, brought
suit. '3 The United States Court of International Trade disagreed and held
that Congress intended that section 606 conform to the GATT 120-day limit
for suspending liquidation. 36 Because the statute was silent, the court held
that section 606 "should not be interpreted by means of tenuous arguments
to yield a construction which would be in contravention of GATT "'I"
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Walter Holm & Co. v Hardin'38 reveals another
approach courts take to avoid express rejection of the GATT when the
GATT and federal law clash."' In Walter Holm, tomato importers attacked
regulations that the Secretary of Agriculture issued pursuant to the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 regulating the size of
tomatoes inported from Mexico."' ° The importers argued, inter alia, that
the regulations were consistent with neither the objectives of the Agricultur-
al Marketing Act nor the GATT " The court held that the Agricultural
Marketing Act delegated to the Secretary the power to promulgate
regulations restricting the size of imported tomatoes, 42 but also held that
the importers had a right to an oral hearing in challenging the regulations,
133. Id. at 497
134. Id. at 498. Part three of Article Five of the GATT Subsidies Code provides that
the "imposition of provisional measures shall be limited to as short a period as possible, not
exceeding four months." GATT, supra note 2, 31 U.S.T. 526, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.
135. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 618 F Supp. 496, 498 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985). While § 606 did not expressly require that the ITA carry out suspension until
making a final determination, United States Steel argued that "§ 606 was designed to
conform to an existing body of countervailing duty law which mandates suspension of
liquidation" until a "final finding." Id.
136. Id. at 500-01.
137 Id. at 501-02.
138. 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
139. See Walter Holm & Co. v Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(upholding validity of regulations Secretary of Agriculture issued pursuant to Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 limiting size of imported tomatoes).
140. Id. at 1011.
141. Id. at 1013.
142. Id. at 1011.
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due in part to the foreign policy implications of the regulations. 43 In
reaching this holding, the court declined to address the GATT issue because
the matter may "have [had] a different cast" when remanded to the
Secretary for review ' Notably, Walter Holm is not the only instance in
which a court avoided construing a statute to conflict with the GATT by
declining to address the GATT question altogether. 45 Nonetheless, the court
was careful not to reject or mininmuze the GATT's significance m domestic
law 146 By holding that an oral hearing was necessary for coordinating
foreign policy, the court implied that the GATT is an important foreign
policy consideration and that the executive branch should take heed when
imposing regulations that may contravene the GATT 147
In Select Tire Salvage Co. v United States,'" the United States Court
of Claims held that imported tire carcasses were not "tires" for excise tax
purposes. 49 In the process, the court briefly addressed the concern that
143. Id. at 1015-16.
144. Id. at 1013. Although the court refused to address the GATT questions, the court
was careful to avoid giving the impression that it was trivializing the role of the GATT in
determining congressional intent. Id., see Brand, supra note 29, at 489 n.52 (citing Walter
Holn for proposition that some courts have avoided question of "GATT applicability").
145. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 440 n.4 (1979) (deeming
argument that local property tax imposed on Japanese vessel contravened GATT to be
frivolous); Select Tire Salvage Co. v United States, 386 F.2d 1008, 1013 (Cl. Ct. 1967)
(stating that GATT does not have treaty status, but is "agreed code of international good
behavior").
146. See Walter Hom, 449 F.2d at 1015 (discussing need to consider intention and
effect of GATT and "Government's policy with respect to GATT").
147 See id. at 1016 (stating that "need for coordination with Government foreign
policy" is one important factor requiring oral hearing).
148. 386 F.2d 1008 (Ct. CI. 1967).
149. See Select Tire Salvage Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 1008, 1015 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(holding that tire carcass importers had no duty to file excise tax returns). In Select Tire,
the plaintiffs imported tire carcasses from Europe and sold the carcasses to domestic
recappers. Id. at 1008. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed an excise tax on the
carcasses pursuant to § 4071 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Id. at 1009. Section
4071 imposed an excise tax on "'tires wholly or in part rubber' or 'tires of the type used
on highway vehicles.'" Id. According to the Court, § 4071 was ambiguous regarding the
meaning of "tires." Id. at 1010. The government argued that "tires" included "all forms
of the article, however worn, defective, disapproved, or unsafe," while the plaintiffs argued
that § 4071 did not encompass tire carcasses. Id. at 1011. The court, using the GATT, as
well as case law and legislative history, held that Congress intended for § 4071 "to raise
revenue, to impose a moderate burden, and to be non-discruminatory" and that the
construction the government advanced failed to accomplish these goals. Id. at 1011-15.
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taxing imported tire carcasses violated GATT obligations. 150  The court
stated that the GATT is not a treaty, and thus, does not bind Congress. 51
Nonetheless, the court construed the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
consistently with the GATT, and held that Congress intended that the
Revenue Code be nondiscrmunatory and, therefore, that it operate
harmoniously with the GATT 152 The court stated that an ambiguous
statutory command required a nondiscriminatory interpretation. 153 Like the
court in Walter Holm, the Claims Court carefully avoided finding that the
GATT was controlling, but did construe the federal statute consistently with
the GATT ,'4
Even when courts have summarily dismissed arguments that the GATT
controls when a federal statute violates the GATT, they have construed
federal law consistently with the GATT In Suramenca de Aleaciones
Laminadas, C.A. v United States,55 the Federal Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that the Commerce Department's interpretation of a
statutory provision that gave domestic industries the power to initiate
countervailing and antidumping investigations against importers violated
GATT obligations. 5 ' The Federal Circuit stated that "the GATT is not
Consequently, the court held that the IRS erred in taxing the imported tire carcasses under
§ 4071. Id. at 1015.
150. See id. at 1013 (discussing GATT implications).
151. Id. The court described the GATT as an "agreed code of international good
behavior." Id.
152. Id. at 1013, 1015. The court noted that the IRS did not similarly apply the excise
tax to domestic carcasses because the IRS felt that "any tax obligation respecting such
carcasses is satisfied if the original tire of which the carcass is the remanent was taxed upon
its sale as new." Id. at 1014. Accordingly, the court held that the application of the tax to
imported tire carcasses violated congressional intent that the tax "'be imposed uniformly and
without discrimination.'" Id. at 1013.
153. Id., see Hudec, supra note 43, at 212-13 (stating that statutory interpretation
applied in Select Tire was supportive of GATT). The GATT provision involved here was
the same Article III, § 2 at issue m Bercut. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text
(discussing Bercut).
154. See supra text accompanying note 146 (noting that Walter Holm court carefully
avoided finding that minimized GATT's importance); see also Hudec, supra note 43, at 214
(discussing GATT's influence over statutory interpretation in Select Tire).
155. 966 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
156. See Suramenca de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v United States, 966 F.2d 660,
667-68 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that "on behalf of" language in Tariff Act allowed any
interested party to initiate countervailing and antidumping investigations). In 1987, the
leading domestic producer of electrical conductor aluminum redraw rod (E.C. rod)
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controlling" when a federal statutory provision conflicts with the GATT '1
This statement appears merely to restate the later-in-time rule. 5 8 The court
implied, however, that it will not attempt to construe a statutory provision
consistently with the GATT even if such a construction is possible.
19
Nonetheless, the court based its decision in part on the conclusion that the
statutory provisions at issue, and the Commerce Department's interpretation
petitioned the Commerce Department to investigate Venezuelan producers of E.C. rod for
countervailing and antidumpmg duty violations. Id. at 661. The producer filed the petitions
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(b), 1673(b), which allow an interested party to initiate
countervailing and antidumpmg proceedings by filing "a petition with the administering
authority, on behalf of an industry " Id. at 664. The Commerce Department investigated
the matter and issued final determinations in both the countervailing and antidumping
investigations against the Venezuelan producers. Id. at 662. In doing so, the Commerce
Department held that an interested party files a petition "on behalf of" the domestic industry
so long as a majority of domestic producers do not oppose the petition. Id. at 662-63. The
United States Court of International Trade, vacating the Commerce Department's
determinations, held that "'the petition was not filed on behalf of the relevant domestic
industry'" because §§ 1671(b), 1673(b) required that a majority of the domestic industry
support the petition. Id. at 663. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that because the statute
was not clear as to the meaning of "on behalf of," the question was whether the Commerce
Department's interpretation was a permissible one. Id. at 666. The court held that several
possible interpretations existed and that the Commerce Department took a middle position.
Id. at 667 According to the court, the Commerce Department's interpretation was therefore
within the range of permissible interpretations. Id. The court also held that the Commerce
Department's interpretation did not violate the GATT. Id. Consequently, the court reversed
the lower court decision. Id. at 668.
157 Id. at 667
158. But see d. (discussing effect of GATT on court's decision). The court stated that
"even if we were convinced that Commerce's interpretation conflicts with the GATT
the GATT is not controlling" and thus implied that courts are bound not only by inconsistent
statutory provisions, but also by inconsistent executive interpretations. Id. (emphasis
added). Such a reading of the court's opinion dramatically expands the scope of the later-m-
time rule. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (stating that later-m-time rule applies
when statute conflicts with prior self-executing treaty).
159. See Suramenca, 966 F.2d at 667-68 (discussing court's lack of authority to bring
statutory provisions into conformity with GATT). The court stated that although it
recogmzed Congress's interest in complying with GATT obligations, the court was "bound
not by what [it] think[s] Congress should orperhaps wanted to do, but by what Congress
in fact did." Id. (emphasis added). This indicates that when statutory language conflicts
with GATT provisions, courts are bound to interpret the language as conflicting with the
GATT even though there is no express indication that Congress wanted to violate the
GATT. The court further implied that it was powerless to bring statutes into conformity
with the GATT by stating that where statutory provisions are inconsistent with the GATT,
"it is a matter for Congress and not this court to decide and remedy " Id. at 668.
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of those provisions, did not violate the GATT 160 Thus, the Suramenca
decision did not involve a conflict between the GATT and federal law and,
therefore, does not provide much guidance as to what courts should do
when faced with two plausible statutory interpretations, one of which
conflicts with the GATT 161
The court in Suramenca relied upon 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) and Algoma
Steel Corp. v United States"62 in concluding that the GATT was not
controlling.163 In Algoma, the Federal Circuit held that § 2504(a) controls
when a conflict between domestic legislation and the GATT exists."6
Section 2504(a) requires courts to give effect to legislation that conflicts
with the GATT 165 The Suramenca opinion unplied that § 2504 instructs
courts to decline to construe federal statutes consistently with the GATT
when statutory provisions appear to conflict with GATT provsions.6
However, the language of § 2504, standing alone, does not explicitly or
implicitly reject the canon that courts should construe a domestic statute
160. Id. at 667 The court concluded that the statutory provisions and the GATT did
not conflict despite a ruling by a GATT panel rejecting the Commerce Department's
definition of "on behalf of." Id. In distinguishing the panel's finding, the court stated that
the "panel itself acknowledged and declared that its examination and decision were limited
in scope to the case before it." Id.
161. See id. (holding that Commerce Department's interpretation of Tariff Act does not
violate GATT).
162. 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
163. Suramenca de Aleaciones Lammadas, C.A. v United States, 966 F.2d 660, 668
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
164. Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The
International Trade Commission (ITC) held that Algoma Steel Corporation (Algoma), a
Canadian steel producer, injured domestic steel producers by selling certain products in the
United States at less than fair value (LTFV). Id. at 241. Algoma, challenging the ITC's
injury determination, argued that the ITC erred in considering other sales Algoma made at
more than fair value (MTFV). Id. The Court of International Trade held that the ITC did
not error in factoring MTFV sales into the injury determination. Id. On appeal, the Federal
Circuit held, inter alia, that the relevant statutory provisions did not preclude consideration
of MTFV sales in making an injury determination. Id. at 242. The court stated that in its
view, the GATT did not embody a contrary position. Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed
the lower court decision. Id. at 243.
165. 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1988); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text
(discussing 1979 Trade Agreements Act and setting out language of § 2504).
166. See Suramenca, 966 F.2d at 668 (stating that Congress, not courts, should remedy
inconsistencies between statutory provisions and GATT); supra note 159 and accompanying
text (discussing Suramerica decision).
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consistently with an international obligation "where fairly possible."' 167
Moreover, if Congress intended § 2504 to limit the authority of courts to
interpret statutes, a separation of powers question may exist.'68
In Sneaker Circus, Inc. v Carter,69 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York held that President Carter complied
with GATT provisions in issuing import relief for domestic shoe makers. 7'
The court carefully reached this conclusion despite holding that the GATT
did not have congressional approval and was, therefore, not applicable.'
This holding, like the holding in Suramerca, implies that courts are
concerned with finding conformity between federal law and the GATT even
in cases when the court rejects the GATT's binding effect."
In several of the decisions discussed above, the statute at issue
arguably benefited domestic industries at the expense of foreign import-
167 Compare 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1988) (stating that no trade agreement conflicting
with domestic statute "shall be given effect") with RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28,
§ 114 (instructing courts to construe domestic statutes consistently with international
obligations "[w]here fairly possible").
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I0, § 1 (granting Judicial Branch "the judicial [p]ower").
169. 457 F Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y 1978).
170. See Sneaker Circus, Inc. v Carter, 457 F Supp. 771, 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(holding that even if GATT was controlling, President did not violate GATT obligations).
Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, the United States negotiated Orderly Marketing
Agreements (OMAs) with the governments of Taiwan and South Korea regarding the
amount of nonrubber athletic footwear those countries could export to the United States.
Id. at 777 The plaintiffs, an importer and a retail wholesaler of the type of footwear
covered by the OMAs, brought suit to enjoin the signing of the OMAs. Id. The plaintiffs
argued, inter alia, that the President did not comply with certain provisions of the Trade Act
of 1974 in negotiating the OMAs and that the OMAs violated the United States GATT
obligations. Id. at 778. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York first held that the plaintiffs had standing, that the case was ripe for adjudication, and
that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. at 779-83. With regard to
the merits, however, the court held, inter alia, that the President complied with all of the
provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 and that the OMAs did not violate the GATT. Id. at
789-95. Accordingly, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief. Id. at 796.
171. Id. at 795. The court stated that even if the GATT was applicable, the United
States could suspend GATT obligations when the import of a particular product would
threaten domestic producers of the same product with serious harm or damage. Id., see
Brand, supra note 29, at 490 (noting that court's finding that GATT was not applicable did
not affect outcome of case).
172. See Suramenca de Aleaciones Lammadas, C.A. v United States, 966 F.2d 660,
667 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that Commerce Department's statutory interpretation did not
conflict with GATT obligations).
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ers.11 Congress, from time to time, attempts to benefit domestic industries
by enacting legislation designed to restrict or hinder imports. 74 Courts
likely will decline to challenge Congress in these instances, even when such
legislation violates GATT obligations. 75 However, Congress also supports
the general goals and designs of the GATT 176 Thus, courts face the
difficult task of reconciling Congress's conflicting desires to please specific
domestic constituents while supporting the general principals of the GATT
Some of the decisions discussed above proclaimed the superiority of
federal law over the GATT 177 Other decisions were more deferential to the
GATT,"I or avoided the issue altogether. 9 However, no court has refused
173. See Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (noting
that Congress realized that its restrictions on commodities could limit quantities of imports);
Bercut-Vandervoort & Co. v United States, 151 F Supp. 942, 947-48 (Cust. Ct. 1957)
(discussing argument that statute provided hidden benefits for domestic producers). In
Mississippi Poultry, the domestic trade associations argued for an interpretation of § 466(d)
of the PPIA that would impose a greater burden on poultry importers. See Mississippi
Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365 (5th Cir.) (suggesting that "effective
lobbying" by domestic poultry industry motivated Congress's policy choice), amended, 9
F.3d 1113 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Also, in the
en bane opinion, the dissent stated that both "the panel opinion and.. .the en banc opinion,
hmt[ed] at a latent congressional purpose of trade protectionism." Mississippi Poultry Ass'n
v Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 311 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
174. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 65 (discussing
perception that Congress favors protective trade measures). Professor Jackson states "that
congressmen, senators, and a plethora of committees often seem bent on adopting a certain
proposal to please specific constituent groups by restricting imports." Id., see also Hudec,
supra note 43, at 240 (noting that Congress has will to legislate m violation of GATT).
175. Cf. Hudec, supra note 43, at 210-11 (stating that no court has ever sustained claum
that GATT obligation overrides federal law).
176. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 9 (quoting 1970 Senate
document stating that "principal goal of American foreign policy" since 1934 has been
removal of trade barriers); supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (discussing
congressional acceptance of GATT obligations).
177 See Hudec, supra note 43, at 211-15 (discussing line of cases finding GATT
inferior to federal statutes); supra note 151 and accompanying text (noting holding in Select
Tire that GATT does not bind Congress); supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing
holding m Sneaker Circus). Professor Hudec argues that Select Tire and Sneaker Circus are
correct in concluding that the GATT is inferior to federal statutes, but that they fail to
explain this conclusion adequately Hudec, supra note 43, at 215.
178. See Hudec, supra note 43, at 215-16 (discussing cases in which GATT influences
statutory interpretation); supra notes 100-37 and accompanying text (discussing holdings in
Bercut, Star Industries, and United States Steel).
179. See Hudec, supra note 43, at 211 (claiming that eight prior cases "avoided the
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to construe a domestic statute, or the GATT itself, to avoid conflict between
the GATT and federal law as boldly as the court did in Mississippi
Poultry 180
B. Mississippi Poultry
The court in Mississippi Poultry recognized three maxims governing
the construction of statutes that potentially conflict with international
obligations."' 1 According to the court, the first maxim is that Congress
must clearly state its intention to abrogate a treaty or international
obligation of the United States.in The second maxim holds that Congress
must clearly state its intent to apply domestic law extraterritonally 18 The
final maxim is that courts should not construe an act of Congress in a
manner that violates the law of nations if another plausible construction
exists."83 Of these three maxims, the court correctly concluded that the
latter two did not apply to the GATT." However, the court's finding that
the first maxmi did not apply is troublesome. 83
The court's definition of the first maxim was unduly narrow in that the
court referred to "abrogation" as opposed to "violation" of a treaty or
international obligation."8 The Restatement (Third) states that courts shall
issue" when there was claim that GATT obligation prevailed over federal law); supra notes
138-47 and accompanying text (discussing decision in Walter Holm).
180. See Hudec, supra note 43, at 211 (discussing prior cases). Professor Hudec states
that courts have often "indicated a willingness to interpret federal law in ways that facilitate
United States compliance with GATT." Id. Hudec notes that although the court m Select
Tire held that the GATT does not bind Congress, the court nonetheless considered the
GATT in construing the federal statute at issue. Id. at 215.
181. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365 (5th Cir.), amended,
9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also supra
note 21 (discussing three maxims of statutory construction).
182. Mississippi Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1365.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1366-67 The court clearly was correct in concluding that Mississippi
Poultry did not involve an extraterritorial application of domestic law and that the GATT
is not customary law. Id.
186. See id. at 1366 (discussing why first maxim does not apply).
187 Id. at 1365-66. The court suggested that Congress needs to express clearly its
intention only when its actions nullify an international obligation. Id. at 1366. This is a
novel suggestion, however, for all other authority appears to indicate that something less
than outright nullification of an international obligation triggers the clear-intent canon. See
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construe statutes "so as not to conflict with international law or with an
international agreement." ' "Conflict" encompasses more than "abroga-
tion."'8 9 Moreover, case law indicates that the clear-intent rule applies
when the statute violates, but does not nullify, an existing international
obligation." In a 1933 case, the Supreme Court stated that "[a] treaty will
not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless
such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed."9, The
court's narrow construction of the clear-intent rule in Mississippi Poultry
clearly conflicts with this language.
The court concluded that existing authority strongly supported the
proposition that the clear-intent rule does not apply when Congress violates
GATT obligations." Suramenca was the specific authority the court relied
upon for this conclusion. 93 The Suramenca decision did question the
applicability of the clear-intent rule to statutes that violate the GATT "9
However, the Suramenca court opined that the Commerce Department's
statutory interpretation did not violate the GATT '9 The court expressed
no such belief in Mississippi Poultry 19 Moreover, not all existing case law
supports the conclusion that the clear-intent rule does not apply when an act
supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing canon of construction when statute
may conflict with international obligation).
188. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (setting out § 114 of RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)).
189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 114 cmt. a (discussing § 114). The
title to comment (a) is "Interpretation to avoid violation by the United States." Id.
(emphasis added).
190. See United States v. Cook, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (stating that Congress must
express clear intent before courts will interpret statute in manner that abrogates or modifies
treaty); United States v Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y
1988) (rejecting argument that ATA contravened Headquarters Agreement); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 114 (reporters' notes) (stating that Supreme Court
has interpreted statutes consistently with "earlier treaty provisions") (emphasis added).
191. Cook, 288 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added).
192. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365 (5th Cir.), amended,
9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
193. Id. at 1365-66.
194. See Suramenca de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v United States, 966 F.2d 660,
660, 667-68 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that GATT does not control when conflict between
GATT and domestic legislation exists).
195. Id. at 667
196. See Mississippi Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1367-68 (rejecting Agency's argument that
court should not interpret PPIA to conflict with GATT).
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of Congress conflicts with the GATT 197 Accordingly, the conclusion that
the clear-intent rule does not apply to legislation that violates GATT
obligations is not as obvious as the court in Mississippi Poultry assumed. 198
The court characterized Mississippi Poultry as a policy dispute between
the legislative and executive branches and declined "to enter the fray "199
In so doing, the court, alluding to the distinction between foreign affairs
and foreign commerce, rejected the Agency's argument that the executive
branch's exclusive domain over foreign affairs mandated that the Agency's
interpretation of section 466(d) of the PPIA prevail." Clearly, Congress,
pursuant to the Constitution, more actively regulates foreign commerce than
other foreign affairs.201 Moreover, the court, in rejecting the Agency's
interpretation of section 466(d), perhaps correctly realized that disputes like
the one in Mississippi Poultry are based primarily on economic, as opposed
to foreign policy, considerations and, therefore, do not require blind
deference to the desires of the executive branch.' Nonetheless, the court,
197 See supra notes 100-37 and accompanying text (discussing cases that gave
deference to GATT).
198. See Misslssippl Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365 (5th Cir.)
(summarily dismissing Agency's argument that court must construe PPIA consistently with
GATT because Congress did not clearly express its intent to violate GATT), amended, 9
F.3d 1113 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane). The court
appeared reluctant even to recognize that the clear-intent canon exists. See id. (indicating
reluctance to recognize clear-intent rule). The court qualified its discussion of the clear-
intent rule with the following language: "Even when we grant arguendo that these truisms
of statutory construction exist, we find them inapplicable and therefore not controlling in the
instant case." Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 1367
200. Id.
201. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADiNG SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 62 (stating that Congress
reserves special powers over matters of economic trade); supra note 82 and accompanying
text (same).
202. See Hudec, supra note 43, at 246 (arguing that trade matters should receive
"objective" judicial supervision). Professor Hudec questions the treatment of foreign trade
matters as "matters of high foreign policy" and characterizes trade disputes as conflicts
between domestic industries that will profit from protectionist trade measures and domestic
groups that will pay for reduced competition. Id. Hudec states that these trade disputes
involve "precisely the sort of potentially smelly dispensation of economic favours" that
deserves active judicial supervision. Id. Following this reasoning, the court m Mississippi
Poultry correctly rejected the Agency's contention that, absent a clear statement of con-
gressional intent, the executive branch had exclusive authority to interpret the PPIA because
the PPIA had foreign policy implications. See Mississippi Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1365
(rejecting Agency's argument that executive branch had exclusive authority).
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by refusing to defer to the Agency's interpretation, departed from the
normal course taken by courts in these types of disputes.2 3  Also, the
court's refusal to defer to the Agency served to nummize the GATT's
significance, a result that does not reflect the reality of United States
foreign trade policy I
C. Alternative Decision
The result in Mississippi Poultry was not necessarily inconsistent with
the results in prior cases involving an alleged conflict between federal law
and the GATT because other courts have also been reluctant to disturb
federal law and risk raising the ire of Congress. 5 Moreover, in light of
the statements Congress inserted into the 1990 Act, the court may have had
little choice but to find that Congress intended that "the same" mean
"identical. "I Nonetheless, the court could have reached the same result
in Mississippi Poultry without disregarding the clear-intent rule.
The clear-intent rule does not require courts to engage in the type of
creative statutory construction that the court in Palestine Liberation
Orgamzation employed.' 1 In stating that Congress made a policy choice,
203. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 67 (stating that judicial
deference to executive branch in foreign affairs "has carried over" to affairs of international
commerce); Hudec, supra note 43, at 246 (arguing that courts continue to defer excessively
to executive branch).
204. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing GATT's role as primary
instrument of U.S. trade policy).
205. C.f. Hudec, supra note 43, at 211 (concluding that case law indicates that GATT
rules are never superior to federal statutes).
206. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing provision in 1990 Farm Bill
stating that Agency erred in interpreting "same as" to mean "at least equal"). But see
Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1368 (5th Cir.) (Reavley, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress did not choose between "identicality" and "equivalence"),
amended, 9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
Judge Reavley argued that the evidence in Mississippi Poultry could not support the
conclusion that Congress intended "the same" to mean identical. See generally d. at 1368-
80 (discussing statutory language and legislative history of PPIA). The dissent to the en
banc opinion made a similar argument. See Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 31 F.3d
293, 310-16 f5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
207 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 115(1)(a) (discussing situation in
which inconsistency between international obligation and domestic law exists). Section
115(1)(a) provides:
(1)(a) An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the
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the court in Mississippi Poultry implied that Congress had considered the
possibility that section 466(d) would place the United States in violation of
international trade obligations."0 This, along with the finding that the
language of section 466(d) "clearly demonstrate[d] that Congress intended
'the same' to be a synonym for 'identical,"' suggests that the court believed
that congressional intent was clear and was inconsistent with the GATT I
Precedent exists for finding that a congressional enactment supersedes
a GATT obligation. In Farr Mann & Co. v United States,10 sugar
importers argued that President Carter violated the GATT's most-favored-
nation requirement by exempting Malawian sugar imports from a presiden-
tial proclamation increasing the import duty on sugar.2 1 The Court of
International Trade held that Congress, in a 1951 amendment to section 22
of the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933,12 intended to supersede the
GATT's most-favored-nation provision.213 The court reached this
conclusion after exanumng the language of section 22, as well as the
legislative history of the 1951 amendment. 214 Although neither the language
purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the
act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.
Id. (emphasis added); see also supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussing
Palestine Liberation Organization decision).
208. See Mississippi Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1367-68.
209. Id. at 1368.
210. 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 55 (1982).
211. See Farr Mann & Co. v United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 55, 56-57 (1982)
(discussing plaintiffs' claim). President Carter issued Proclamation No. 4547, which
increased duties on sugar imports. Id. at 56. Proclamation No. 4547 exempted Malawian
sugar from the higher duties, and the plaintiffs brought suit, claiming, inter alia, that an
1853 Treaty and a subsequent Trade Agreement between Argentina and the United States,
as well as the GATT, precluded the United States from granting an exemption to a single
country only Id. at 56-57, 62. The Court of International Trade held that Congress
intended for § 22 of the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA) to give the President
the authority to grant preferential trade concessions, regardless of any international trade
agreements or obligations. Id. at 63-66. Accordingly, the court held that the President's
exercise of authority pursuant to § 22 of the AAA superseded the requirements of any
international obligations and granted the government's motion for summary judgment. Id.
at 66.
212. Act of June 16, 1951, ch. 141, § 8(b), 65 Stat. 75 (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 624(f) (1988)).
213. Farr Mann, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade at 66.
214. Id. at 64-66. Section 22(f) provides:
No trade agreement or other international agreement heretofore or hereafter
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of section 466(d) nor the PPIA's legislative history contained an explicit
congressional declaration that section 466(d) was to supersede all interna-
tional obligations, the court in Mississippi Poultry, like the court in Farr
Mann, found that Congress's intent was clear.2 5 Moreover, the court did
not reject the Agency's claim that the "identical" interpretation of section
466(d) violated the GATT 216 Assuming that Congress understood the
United States obligations under the GATT when it enacted section 466(d),
the court, like the court in Farr Mann, could have found that Congress
intended that section 466(d) supersede the GATT 217
V Conclusion
The GATT does not exhibit the characteristics of more traditional
international obligations. 2 8 Accordingly, courts have struggled to articulate
clearly and consistently the GATT's status in relation to federal law when
federal law allegedly conflicts with GATT obligations.2t 9 One can analyze
the panel opinion in Mississippi Poultry as an attempt to clarify the GATT's
status in United States domestic law The panel opimon implies that the
GATT does not deserve the same level of deference as other international
obligations. However, the panel's characterization of the GATT does not
entered into by the United States shall be applied in a manner inconsistent with
the requirements of this section.
7 U.S.C. § 624(f) (1988).
215. See Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365-68 (5th Cir.)
(holding that Agency's interpretation of "same as" did not comport with congressional
intent), amended, 9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993) (en
banc).
216. See id. (rejecting Agency's interpretation despite Agency's claim that competing
interpretation placed United States in violation of GATT).
217 See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing § 115(i)(a) of RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)). The court's finding with regard to congressional intent leads to the
conclusion that § 466(d) of the PPIA cannot be "fairly reconciled" with the GATT.
RESTATEMENT (THim), supra note 28, § 115(1)(a). But see Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v
Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 312 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)
(stating that "Congress made no indication whatsoever" in legislative history that PPIA was
intended to do anything other than promote health and safety of domestic poultry market).
218. Cf. Jackson, GATT in U.S. Law, supra note 3, at 252 (stating that GATT is "an
anomaly among major international institutions").
219. See Brand, supra note 29, at 490 (noting that no courts have provided "direct
authority on" or "probing analysis" of GATT's status in domestic law); Hudec, supra note
43, at 199 (concluding that courts have failed to provide adequate analysis of GATT's status
in domestic law).
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accurately reflect the unportant role that the GATT occupies in United
States trade and economic policy I Consequently, Mississippi Poultry fails
to provide a persuasive, or even adequate, analysis of the GATT's status
in United States domestic law
Future courts, when faced with a statutory interpretation that violates
GATT obligations, should decline to follow the reasoning the court
employed in Mississippi Poultry Courts should apply the clear-intent rule
in such situations because no indication exists that the GATT is any less
deserving of deference than other international obligations."2 Moreover,
the clear-intent rule is sufficiently flexible for courts to uphold legislation
when Congress clearly has indicated an intent to legislate in a manner that
violates GATT obligations.'
Thomas William France
120. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting GATT's significance in U.S. trade
policy).
221. See supra notes 74-94 and accompanying text (discussing GATT's status in U.S.
domestic law).
222. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing § 115(1)(a) of RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD); in particular, language indicating that courts should find that statute
supersedes international obligation if statute cannot be "fairly reconciled" with obligation).
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